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BUNDLING DECISIONS BY A MULTIPRODUCT MONOPOLIST 
WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
BY THOMAS R. p ALFREY I 
This paper analyzes bundling decisions of a rnultiproduct monopolist facing uncertain 
demand. The monopolist sells his products using an auction mechanism and the market is 
analyzed as a game with incomplete information in which the buyers as well as the seller 
are strategic ager.ts. With a small number of buyers, a profit maximizing seller will bundle 
all his output. This makes buyers uniformly worse off compared to the case where the same 
monopolist does not bundle, in the sense that any buyer is worse off regardless of his 
demand for the monopolist's outputs. With a larger number of buyers, the seller will have a 
tendency to unbundle his output and "high-demand" buyers are worse off than they would 
be if the monopolist bundled his output. "Low-demand" buyers. on the other hand. are 
always better off when the monopolist unbundles his output, regardless of the number of 
competing buyers. Despite the fact that "high demand" buyers are the typical purchasers 
of the monopolist's output, the net effect of increasing the number of buyers is greater 
market efficiency since bundling creates market inefficiencies both ex posr and ex anre. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
AN IMPORTANT TOPIC in the theory of monopolistic behavior involves one aspect 
of the marketing strategy of a monopolist, the "bundling" of output for sale. For 
example, tying contracts have been the subject of both academic research and 
landmark court cases.2 The basic problem is the following. The monopolist is the 
only provider of J types of products or services. Barring legal restrictions, the 
seller may refuse to sell one of the items, unless the buyer also agrees to purchase 
another product or service. Such an arrangement is called a tying contract.3 
Typical explanations for such marketing behavior include the following: (i) 
The items named in a tying contract are complementary products or services. (ii) 
Monopoly power in one product line can provide leverage in related markets in 
which the seller does not have an exclusive position. (iii) There are economies of 
scope in producing or distributing the quantities together. (iv) Tied sales may be 
a convenient way to avoid price controls. A recent example of this occurred 
during the May, 1979 gasoline shortage, during which some gasoline stations 
offered gasoline only to customers who also paid for a carwash. 
Recent work by Adams and Yellen [1] and Phillips [14] have sought alternative 
explanations for commodity bundling which are not based on demand or 
production interdependencies or distortions caused by regulatory controls. 
1 The author thanks Gary Chamberlain, Roger Noll, Michael Rothschild, Charles Wilson, partici-
pants of the University of Chicago Public Policy Workshop, and an anonymous referee for helpful 
comments and suggestions. Any errors in the paper are mine. 
2 See. for example. Scherer [17, pp. 505-512), Bailey [2]. Phillips (14), Adams and Yellen (1). 
Burstein (3). Telser (19), and Stigler (18). 
3These may also be referred to as tied-in sales. bundling decisions, or packaging decisions. An 
important point here is that tying contracts occur frequently in highly competitive markets as well, 
and may often be an efficient method of allocating resources. In other words, "tying contract" should 
carry no particular positive or negative connotation. 
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Adams and Yellen demonstrate the plausibility of commodity bundling in a 
two-good world in which there is no uncertainty, all agents have complete and 
perfect information, demands for the two goods are independent, and production 
of the two goods exhibits no joint economies. In their model, the allocation 
mechanism involves the seller setting a take-it-or-leave-it price at which he is 
willing to deliver any quantity a buyer demands. In a similar context, Phillips 
obtains conditions on cross-price demand relationships between the two com-
modities under which a monopolist would choose one bundling strategy as 
opposed to another. Both find that some form of bundling may occur under 
these circumstances. 
This paper also focuses on a monopolist selling several independent goods. 
However, in the framework used here, the buyers and seller possess incomplete 
and asymmetric information about the preferences of the participants in the 
market. Each individual knows with certainty his or her own preferences but is 
uncertain of the other agents' preferences. The market mechanism for determin-
ing a price in both markets is an auction. 
There are a number of reasons for considering the bundling problem within 
the context of an auction pricing mechanism. The most obvious reason is that in 
many auctions one observes bundling practices by the seller. In land auctions, 
estate auctions, auctions for mineral rights, auctions for contract procurement, 
auctions for collectables, and other auctions, this frequently occurs. To date, this 
has not been explored in the literature. Second, the analysis of bundling decisions 
when the monopolist has incomplete information about the preferences of the 
potential buyers is another gap in the theory. Auctions are very natural price 
mechanisms to focus on when uncertainty exists, since sellers often price by 
auction when information about demand is incomplete.4 
From a slightly different perspective, there is an additional important reason 
for analyzing bundling practices in auctions. Most research on auctions has 
concentrated on single-good auctions. A number of authors have pointed out 
that it is only occasionally that one observes what can truly be called single-good 
auctions. 5 Thus, one would like to extend the theory of auctions to situations in 
which several different goods are being sold by a monopolist. One of the natural 
problems to explore first is the seller's bundling decision. 
The results obtained in this paper indicate that a monopolist's bundling 
decision is strongly influenced by the number of buyers in the market. When 
there are few buyers, the seller adopts a strategy according to which different 
goods are never sold separately; they are bundled and sold as a single lot. When 
there are a large number of buyers, this incentive to bundle disappears. In 
addition, the sale of goods separately is found to be superior to the sale of goods 
as a bundle according to several different welfare measures. 
4 Harris and Raviv [6. 7] offer one explanation for the common use of auctions when uncertainty is 
present. 
5 See. for example, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber [5], Palfrey [12, 13]. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Thu, 03 Mar 2016 18:52:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BUNDLING DECISIONS 465 
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. Section 2 sets up the 
general model for an arbitrary number of buyers and an arbitrary number of 
goods, and provides a discussion of several different ways of approaching welfare 
questions relating to the bundling problem. Section 3 presents the illustrative case 
in which there are two buyers and an arbitrary number of goods. Conditions are 
derived under which the seller will choose a single bundled auction rather than 
separate auctions. Efficiency, both ex post and ex ante, of the resulting equilib-
rium is examined. Section 4 analyzes the general case of n buyers and J goods. 
Section 5 offers some concluding remarks about the results obtained here and 
describes how these results are suggestive of what one might observe in environ-
ments which differ from the one set forth in this paper. 
2. THE GENERAL MODEL 
A single seller has one unit of each of J indivisible goods to sell. The seller's 
cost for each good is zero. There are n buyers. Denote by xJ buyer i's holding 
(either 0 or 1) of good). Each buyer has a utility function U; = M; + "Z)= 1xjvj. 
The seller has incomplete information about demand in the sense that the seller 
knows only that for any i and j, the reservation value of item j to buyer i, vj, is a 
random variable which is distributed on the interval [!2, v] according to the 
cumulative distribution function, F/ ( · ), with a continuous probability density 
function, .f/( · ), which is strictly positive on [!2, v], !2 > 0. The holding of the 
numeraire commodity by buyer i is symbolized by M'. Assume that all nJ 
random variables are identically and independently distributed. The set of 
reservation values {vi, ... , vj} is known to buyer i, but i has only the same 
incomplete information as the seller about each of the other buyers' valuations. 
The two auction mechanisms considered here are the second-price (Vickrey) 
auction and the first-price (discriminatory) auction. In both auctions, the bidders 
submit simultaneous sealed bids and the bidder who submits the highest positive 
bid wins the item. In the Vickrey auction, the winning bidder pays the seller the 
second highest bid. In the discriminatory auction, the payment is the winning 
bid. In the Vickrey auction, bidders are commonly assumed to use dominant 
strategies, which exist under this particular arrangement. In the discriminatory 
auction, buyers are assumed to follow Bayesian equilibrium strategies (Harsanyi 
[8]), since dominant strategies do not exist. According to this equilibrium 
concept, there is a bidding function, b*( v ), such that if a buyer has a reservation 
value v for an item, or a package of items, he can do no better in expected value 
terms than submitting a bid of b*( v ), assuming that every other buyer also bids 
according to the same bidding function. 6 
The seller produces the items at no cost and bundles them for sale in such a 
"Because all agents are risk neutral. all results apply equally, except where noted. to first- and 
second-price auctions. In the analysis which follows. we assume for convenience that a Vickrey 
auction is the mechanism used by the seller. 
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way as to max1m1ze expected profits. A bundling decision, p, is defined as a 
partition of the set of items into a set of subsets, { p 1, ••• , PK } = p, where KP is 
the cardinality of p. We will refer to the subsets as bundles. I~ other words: 
P = { P1, · · · , PK } p such that 
(1) for i * j, 
KP 
(2) LJ Pk= {I, · · · , J } , 
k~l 
(3) Pk =!=0 for k = 1, ... , KP . 
The set of all partitions will be denoted 01. The seller then sells in independent 
auctions each of these bundles, using either Vickrey or discriminatory sealed-bid 
auctions. 
From the utility function, the buyers have induced reservation values for each 
bundle of goods, Pk, of p. Since reservation values are assumed to be additive, the 
valuation bidder i has for this bundle, v;k, is simply equal to 2'.JEJ,k v/. 
The valuation, v;k, is treated as a random variable by all buyer~ other than i 
and by the seller. Since the random variables, { vj }, are all independent and the 
values of items are additive for any individual, the random variable for the value 
of a bundle is the sum of the random variables of the items in the bundle. 
Therefore, the cumulative distribution function of this new random variable, Hpk, 
is the convolution of the distribution functions of each of the items in bundle Pk. 
Buyers' Preferences over Bundling Decisions 
The surplus to the buyers in an auction is 0 if someone else wins the auction 
and otherwise equals the difference between his valuation of the bundle being 
sold and his payment to the seller for the bundle. In the analysis which follows, 
only the Vickrey auction is analyzed. Obvious extensions to other auction 
mechanisms (such as the discriminatory auction) are discussed later. The reason 
for looking at the Vickrey auction is that equilibrium bidding strategies of the 
buyers are simple (i.e., each buyer bids his valuation). Because of this the 
intuition behind the results will be easier to explain and hopefully simpler to 
grasp. 
In the Vickrey auction with n buyers the expected surplus to buyer i, with 
valuation v;k, Es;k<v;k), is the probability that v;k > v}k, 1=1, ... , i - I, i + 
1, ... , n times the expected highest valuation of the other bidders, conditional 
on everyone else's valuation being less than v;k. That is, 
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It is a simple exercise to show that 
prob{ v;k > v;k, 'i I =I= i} = [ Hpk( v;k ) r- i 
and, denoting the number of items in bundle Pk by Kpk, 
Integration by parts simplifies the right hand side of (2) to 
Substitution into (I) yields 
The expected surplus to a buyer for the auction of all J items under an 
arbitrary bundling decision p is 
If p and q are two bundling decisions, the ex ante preference relation for buyer 
i, >-, is defined as 
One should note that this ex ante notion is not always used in the auction 
literature. Matthews [9], for example, means by ex ante that the buyers do not 
even know their own valuations. This "veil of ignorance" expected surplus 
function for an agent would be 
To interpret (4), note that the kth term of the summation is just the expected 
difference between the highest and second highest valuation of bundle Pk, 
divided by n. 
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Finally, it is conceivable that a buyer might earn greater surplus in one 
bundling decision than in another regardless of other buyers' valuations. If this is 
the case we will say a buyer prefers the one bundling decision to the other ex 
post. If a buyer always prefers p to q ex post (ex ante) regardless of his own 
valuations, we will say buyers unanimously prefer p to q ex post (ex ante). 
Profit to Seller 
If a seller makes bundling decision p, then the expected profit from each 
bundle. p., k = 1, ... , KP is equal to the expected second highest valuation of Pk· 
This can be expressed as 
which can be rewritten as 
Thus, the seller's expected profit from bundling decision p is 
The seller's ex ante preference relation, >-, is defined by: 
p _C_ q¢;. EIT; 2 Ell~. 
As with the buyers, we will say the seller prefers one bundling decision to another 
ex post if the one yields more profit for every possible configuration of buyers' 
valuations. 
Welfare Measures 
A third and a fourth preference relation over bundling decisions, which 
represent two alternative welfare measures, or "policy-maker preferences" can 
now be defined. Suppose the policy-maker knows only the probability distribu-
tion of the buyers' valuations. One ranking which is complete and transitive 
orders the bundling decisions according to expected consumer plus producer 
surplus. Because the policy-maker does not know each buyer's valuations, only 
the veil of ignorance expected surplus value given in equation (4) can be used to 
evaluate a buyer's expected profit. Thus, the expected total surplus from bun-
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dling decision p, combining (4) and (6), is 
(7) ETSp = n k~l ~:::k[ J:K} Hpk(x)r-i dx ]hpk(t)dt 
Expression (7) is the sum of the expected highest valuations of each bundle. 
The second welfare criterion, although not necessarily a complete relation, is 
the ex post dominance relation defined over bundling decisions. According to 
Vickrey [20], Matthews [9], and others, ex post Pareto optimality occurs if and 
only if there are no individually rational recontracting possibilities after the 
auction. In other words, for each item, whoever purchased that item in the 
auction is the buyer whose valuation was highest. 
The dominance relation is defined in the following way. Bundling decision p 
dominates bundling decision q ex post if, in every state of the world which can 
possibly obtain, the total surplus generated by p is at least as great as the surplus 
generated by q. 
3. BUNDLING DECISIONS WITH TWO BUYERS 
The case of two buyers (n = 2) and an arbitrary number of goods (J 2:: 2) is 
analyzed first. The reason for this is when there are only two bidders, the results 
are completely independent of the number of goods, and in fact are true under 
more general assumptions about the information structure than are posited 
elsewhere in the paper. Because of this, the intuition underlying the seller's 
bundling problem, buyers' surplus, and relative welfare rankings of bundling 
decisions is particularly easy to grasp. The treatment of this case first is intended 
to illuminate some of the less intuitive results of the next section which examines 
the much more complicated bundling problem when there are more than two 
buyers. 
Several results are obtained when there are two bidders. First, buyers unani-
mously prefer J separate auctions to any other bundling decision by the seller, ex 
ante. Moreover, buyers unanimously prefer separate auctions ex post. Regardless 
of the configuration of valuations of the two buyers for the j goods, each bidder 
will earn the highest surplus if the seller's bundling decision is to conduct J 
separate auctions, one for each good. 
The second result is that the seller prefers a single bundled auction to any 
other bundling decision, ex post. Obviously bundling all J goods will maximize 
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expected profit as well, so the seller also prefers a bundled auction ex ante. 
Observe that not only is this a less than optimal bundling decision from each 
buyer's point of view, but in fact it is the very worst bundling decision for each 
buyer. 
One might suspect that in expectation the extra seller profits could more than 
offset the lower buyer surplus resulting from bundling, in which case bundling 
might be socially optimal ex ante. The third result, that any bundling at all leads 
to an inefficient allocation both ex post and ex ante, states that the above 
possibility never occurs. 
THEOREM I: If there are 2 buyers, then buyers unanimously prefer separate 
auctions ex ante and ex post. 
PROOF: Call the two bidders A and B. Without loss of generality suppose 
v/ =F v/,J = 1, ... , J. Define 
JA = {i E p, ... , J} Iv/> v/}, 
18 = {i E p, ... , J} Iv/ < v/ }· 
A wins if and only if his valuation is greater than B's valuation for the item and 
earns a surplus equal to the difference between their valuations. Hence, A's 
surplus in J separate auctions, s::,p, is given by 
J 
S;;!P = 2: ( v/ - v/). 
j=I 
jEJA 
If all J items are bundled together, A receives 0 if 2:~= 1 v/ < 2:~= 1 v/ and 
otherwise receives 
J 
s:un = 2: (v/ - v/) 
j=I 
J J 
= 2: ( v/ - v/) + 2: ( v/ - v/) 
j=I j=I 
jEJA jEJn 
J 
= s,~p + 2: (v/ - v/). 
j=I 
jEJn 
Since v/ - v/ < 0 if and only if j E 18 , 
J 
2: ( v/ - v/) < 0 
j=I 
jEJn 
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so long as J 8 is nonempty. Thus bidder A's surplus in the bundled auction is 
max{o, S~P + ± ( v/ - v/)} 
;=1 
)EJB 
which never exceeds S~r· In fact whenever JA and 18 are both non-empty, 
bidder A is strictly better off with separate auctions. Q.E.D. 
As an example to illustrate this result, consider the case when J = 3, !2 = 0, 
- - I ( A A A) - (I I 2) d ( B B B) - ( 3 I I) Th SA - 5 SA V - ' VI ' V2 ' V3 - 4' 3' 3 an VI ' V2 ' V3 - 4' 2' 4 · en sep - TI , bun 
= 0, S,~P = 1 and s:un = t. Both bidders are strictly better off in separate 
auctions. What drives the result is that in bundled auctions the winning bidder 
effectively pays the other bidder's valuation for each item in the bundle. 
Whenever the other bidder's valuation exceeds his, he loses surplus relative to 
separate auctions, since he only wins in separate auctions when he values a good 
more than the other bidder. 
Since the above result is true for any J, buyers prefer separate auctions to any 
other bundling decision. Finally note that since any buyer is better off with 
separate auctions regardless of the valuations of the other bidder, expected buyer 
surplus is maximized for any buyer under separate auctions. 
When there are only two bidders, the seller's problem can be analyzed in a 
similar fashion. In particular, one can prove the following result. 
THEOREM 2: If there are 2 bidders, then the seller maximizes profit by bundling 
all the goods in a single auction. 
PROOF: Consider any bundling decision, p, other than the one in which all 
goods are bundled together. Since buyers bid their true valuations the profit to 
the seller in the auction for bundle Pk E p is minCS;= 1.JEp, v/, ~;= i.JEp, v/), so: 
Kr [ J J I 
7T;,' = :2: min :2: v/ , :2: v/ /. 
k=l j=l j=l J 
jEp, )Epk 
The profit if all items are bundled together and sold in a single lot, the profit to 
the seller, denoted by 7T;, is 
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Since the sum of minimum values is always less than or equal to the minimum of 
the sum of the same values, we have 
KP [ J J l 2: min 2: v/ , .L v/ ::; min 
k=l j=l j=l 
)Epk jEfk 
In addition, the above inequality holds strictly unless one of the bidders has the 
highest valuation of all k bundles in p. Hence the seller is at least as well off 
bundling all the goods and is sometimes strictly better off. Since valuations were 
chosen arbitrarily and the comparison bundling decision, p, was chosen arbitrar-
ily, the profit maximizing bundling decision for the seller is to conduct a single 
auction in which all J goods are bundled together. Q.E.D. 
Using the sample example as before, where J = 3, !2 = 0, v = 1, (v~, v).4 , 
vi) = ( 1, 1, ~·) and ( vf, vf, vf) = ( ~, 1, i ), the seller's profit in 3 separate auc-
. s . 5 d s . 15 tlons, ?Tscr' is 6 an ?Tr is 12 . 
The third and final result of this section is that the benefit to the buyers from 
separate auctions (relative to a bundled auction) is always greater than the 
benefit the seller gains from conducting a bundled auction. 
THEOREM 3: If there are 2 buyers, total surplus is maximized when there are J 
separate auctions and is minimized in a single bundled auction. 
PROOF: As in Theorem 2, consider a nontrivial bundling decision p, and 
denote TSP as the total surplus under p, which simply equals the sum across 
bundles of the highest bidders' valuations. That is, 
KP [ J J l TSP = 2: max 2: v/ , . 2: v/ . 
k=l )=1 1=1 
)Efk )Efk 
The total surplus when all goods are bundled together is 
Since the maximum of a sum of values (TSP) is always less than or equal to the 
sum of the maximum of values (TSP), we obtain 
[ 
KP J KP J l KP [ J J l 
max 2: 2: v/ , 2: 2: v/ ::; 2: max 2: v/ , 2: v/ 
k=l ;=1 k=l ;=1 k=l ;=I ;=1 
)Efk )Epk )Efk )Epk 
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so TSP ~ TSP for any p. Moreover, TSP < TSP unless one of the bidders has the 
highest valuation for all the bundles in p. Therefore, total surplus is minimized 
when all items are bundled together. Since this is true for all J, total surplus is 
maximized when a separate auction is conducted for each item. Q.E.D. 
A number of remarks can be made regarding these results for the two-bidder 
case. 
REMARK I: The only assumptions used were that there are two bidders, own 
valuations are known with certainty, the seller conducts a Vickrey auction, and 
the values are additive. Thus these results do not depend upon the i.i.d. 
assumption about buyer valuations. They hold regardless of dependence across 
either bidders or goods.7 Furthermore, the two buyers need not even have the 
same distribution of valuations. Finally, because these results are true regardless 
of assumptions on distributions of valuations, the buyers need not know the 
distribution of valuations of the other bidders. 
REMARK 2: Although the results merely state the most and least preferred 
bundling decisions for the seller and buyer and the highest and lowest total 
surplus bundling decisions, somewhat more can be asserted about relative 
rankings of bundling decisions. 
Specifically the results can be generalized in the following way: If bundling 
decision p is a finer partition of the set of goods bundling decision p', then: (i) 
buyers unanimously prefer p top'; (ii) seller's profit is higher under p ' than p; (iii) 
total surplus is higher under p than p'. Again, this holds regardless of the joint 
distribution of valuations. 
REMARK 3: Because the seller earns greatest profit by bundling all goods, a 
profit maximizing seller will pick the worst bundling decision both from the point 
of view of buyers and in welfare terms. 
REMARK 4: The results are robust with respect to the risk attitudes of the seller 
and the buyers, since the buyers' and seller's rankings of bundling decisions were 
ex post. That is, these rankings were completely independent of the actual 
valuations of the buyers. Thus risk averse and risk preferring buyers and sellers 
would have the same rankings as above, and the welfare conclusions woukl be 
the same. 
REMARK 5: In a discriminatory auction, buyers unanimously prefer separate 
auctions ex ante, but not ex post. That is, for some configurations of buyer 
valuations, one of the buyers may earn greater 5urplus when the seller bundles. 
7 If buyers <lo not know their own valuation with certainty, as in Milgrom and Weber (10], then 
dependence can matter. 
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Similarly, in a discriminatory auction, the seller prefers a bundled auction ex 
ante, but not always ex post. The reason for this is that in a discriminatory 
auction a buyer pays his own bid if he wins, and his bidding decision is based on 
the expected valuations of the other bidder. In the Vickrey auction, his bid is 
made without considering the other bidder's distribution of valuations and the 
amount a bidder pays (if he wins) is independent of his own bid. The welfare 
result (Theorem 3) remains true ex ante and ex post. For proofs of these results, 
see Palfrey [12]. 
REMARK 6: The ex post analysis of Theorems I and 2 cannot be extended in 
any way if there are more than two bidders. It is for this reason that ex ante 
notions such as expected buyer surplus and expected seller profits were concen-
trated on in discussions in Section 2. That these results do not extend is 
encouraging, for it suggests that the inefficiencies from the seller's bundling 
decision are less pervasive in large markets, i.e., when there are many bidders. 
The next section explores this possibility and demonstrates that with large 
numbers of bidders incentives operate on the seller to "unbundle" the goods. 
4. BUNDLING DECISIONS WHEN THERE ARE MORE THAN 2 BIDDERS 
The last remark in the previous section can be illustrated by a simple example 
in which n = 3 and J = 2. Suppose the valuations for the three bidders are 
( v~, v:) = (10, IO), ( vi8, v{1) = (2, 8), ( vf, v:f) = (8, 2). The seller's profit in a 
bundled auction will be IO, and profit in separate auctions would be 8 + 8 = 16. 
Thus the seller is better off with separate auctions. Bidder A will earn a surplus of 
20 - IO= IO in a bundled auction and (IO - 8) +(IO - 8) = 4 in separate auc-
tions. In other words, for this particular configuration of valuations, buyer A is 
better off when the goods are bundled and the seller is better off when they are 
sold separately. Therefore, we can no longer make general statements about seller 
and buyer preferences independent of the configuration of buyer valuations 1f there 
are 3 or more buyers. 
However, the welfare results remain true, as a trivial extension of Theorem 3 
shows. 
THEOREM 4: Separate auctions maximize total surplus (and hence expected total 
surplus). 
PROOF: Using the same notation as in Theorem 3, except denoting a represen-
tative bidder by i, we obtain 
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and 
By a similar argument as before, TSP~ TSfi, with equality if and only if the same 
bidder has the highest valuation for each bundle inp. Q.E.D. 
Remark 2 of the previous section also applies here. Finer partitions yield 
higher total surplus (and expected total surplus). 
With more than two bidders, Theorems 1 and 2 change somewhat, and in this 
section we obtain conditions characterizing when buyers prefer separate auctions 
ex ante and when the seller will choose to bundle. Fortunately, these conditions 
lend themselves to a simple, intuitive interpretation. First, we show that buyers 
unanimously prefer separate auctions ex ante if and only if they unanimously 
prefer separate auctions ex post. Stated in another way, buyers never unani-
mously prefer separate auctions ex ante or ex post if there are three or more 
bidders.8 
Next we demonstrate that it is the buyers with relatively high valuations for 
goods who prefer bundled auctions ex ante, while buyers with relatively low 
valuations still prefer separate auctions. (Notice that in the example at the 
beginning of this section, it was the buyer with high valuations for both goods 
who preferred a bundled auction.) Finally, it is shown that for large numbers of 
buyers, a profit maximizing seller will tend to choose to conduct separate 
auctions, which, from Theorem 4, is the total surplus maximizing bundling 
decision. 
Before proceeding with formal proofs, it is helpful to provide some motivation 
for these results. The reason why high valuation bidders prefer bundled auctions 
is that bundling changes the distribution of valuations in a way which is 
favorable to them. The distribution of valuations for a bundle is (appropriately 
defined) a mean-preserving contraction of the distribution of valuations for its 
component goods.9 Buyers who are on the upper tail of the distribution of 
valuations for the bundle are more likely to win the bundled auction and the next 
highest bidder is likely to have relatively lower valuations than in the separate 
distributions. Therefore, the bidders who are most likely to win the auctions 
prefer bundled auctions. As n gets larger, it is increasingly likely that at least one 
of the buyers will have valuations on the upper tail of the distribution and hence 
more likely that the winner of an auction is a buyer who prefers a bundled 
auction. However, from Theorem 4, we know that expected total surplus is 
maximized with separate auctions. Expected total surplus is expected seller profit 
x It is also easy to show that if n > 2 no buyer has a defined preference between a ny two bundling 
decisions ex post, although this is not formally proved here. 
qSee Palfrey [12] for a proof of this. 
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plus expected buyer surplus, the latter determined primarily by the expected 
buyer surplus of those (high valuation) buyers most likely to win. Since high 
valuation buyers have a higher expected surplus with a bundled auction and total 
expected surplus is maximized in separate auctions, sellers are likely to have a 
higher expected surplus with separate auctions. The above argument is only 
intended as a heuristic one. However, it should provide some insight and 
explanation for the technical results which follow. 
THEOREM 5: Buyers unanimously prefer (ex ante) J separate auctions to a single 
bundled auction if and only if 
(8) 
PROOF: The proof has two parts. First it is established that a buyer with 
"balanced" valuations (i.e., v = v{ = · · · = v)) prefers separate auctions to a 
bundled auction if and only if (8) holds for t = v. Second it is shown that a buyer 
with unbalanced valuations v{, ... , v) prefers separate auctions if the corre-
sponding buyer i' with balanced valuations v;' = · · · = v)· = (1/1>:2::;~iv/ pre-
fers separate auctions. 
Consider a buyer with valuations v{ = · · · = v) = v. From equation (3), that 
buyer prefers separate auctions if and only if 
] f,v[ F(x) ]n-1 dx~ l~.v[ H(y) ]n-1 dy 
- -
where His the I-fold convolution of F. By a simple change of variable, the right 
hand side of the above inequality is J J~ [H(Jx)]dx, which gives us 
l i': [ F ( x) Jn - 1 dx ~ l f." [ H ( l x) J " - 1 dx 
- -
or 
The second step of the theorem involves showing that for any v 1, ••• , vJ such 
that VJ E [:!2, v] VJ. 
(l/Jl2:}~1t., (l/J)2:}~1l', J [ F(x)r- 1 dx~ J [ H(Ix)r- 1 dx 
~ ~ 
implies 
2:}~ I VI J [H(y)r-1dy. 
Jv 
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Again, by a simple change of variable, the last inequality reduces to 
(1 / J )Lj~ 1V; 
:}- 1t1 ~"1[F(x)r - 1 dx~ { [H(Ix)r - 'dx. 
To obtain this inequality, we need only show that 
(l /J)2:]~ 1 Vj 
:}- 1t,~v1 [F(x)r - 1 dx~ ~ [F(x)r - 'dx 
or 
. (l / J)2:]- 1v1  
± J "J [ F ( x) r-1 dx ~ ] J . [ F ( X) r- 1 dx. 
1 = I .':'. .':'. 
To show this, consider the problem of minimizing the function G(v 1, ••• , vn) 
= L;=i fJ [F(x)r - 'dx subject to the constraints that v1 E [Q,ii] for all j and 
L;= 1v1 = -C, a constant. It is easily verified that the problem is convex, so first 
order conditions of the associated Lagrangian characterize a minimum as long as 
the solution is in [!2, vf The Lagrangian is 
!:(VI ' . . . ' VJ 'A) = j~I ~v; [ F ( X) r-I dx + A [ jt I VJ - Cl 
The first order conditions are 
(j = 1, ... '1) 
and 
which implies that v 1 = · · · = v1 = C / J is the solution. Therefore 
(l / J)2: j - 1v1 Jtl ~v1 [ F(x) r-t dx~ { [ F(x) r-' dx. 
Combining these two steps establishes the result. Q.E.D. 
THEOREM 6: Buyers never unanimously prefer separate auctions when there are 
more than two buyers. 
PROOF: From Theorem 5, it will be sufficient to show that for some v E [!2, ii], 
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In particular it can be shown that when n z 3 the above inequality holds for 
v = t'. Let m = n - I. Since n z 3, it follows that m z 2. By Theorem 4, with m 
bidders, m z 2, the expected surplus in separate auctions is greater than or equal 
to the expected surplus in a bundled auction. From equation (7), this inequality 
can be expressed as 
J f"mxf(x)[ F(x) J"'- 1 dxz l~cmxh(x)[ H(x) J"'- 1 dx 
- -
where H is the ]-fold convolution of F. Integrating by parts and rearranging 
gives 
f :c { [ F ( X) J m - [ H ( J X) J m } dx <::: 0 
as the mathematical equivalent of the statement, "expected total surplus in 
separate auctions is at least as great as expected total surplus in a bundled 
auction." A straightforward argument contained in Palfrey [12] demonstrates 
that this inequality is always strict. Since n {[F(x)yn - [H(JxW} dx < 0, a 
buyer who has valuations v; = · · · = v; = v will strictly prefer a bundled 
auction if n - I = m z 2. Hence for n z 3, buyers do not unanimously prefer 
separate auctions. Moreover, some buyers are best off if all goods are bundled 
together. Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY: Buyers unanimous{v prefer separate auctions ex ante if and on{v if 
they unanimous{v prefer separate auctions ex post. 
PROOF: By Theorems 1 and 6, buyers unanimously prefer separate auctions ex 
post if and only if there are two buyers. Similarly they unanimously prefer 
separate auctions ex ante if and only if there are two buyers. Q.E.D. 
THEOREM 7: If there are n > 2 bidders, there exists vn E [JQ,Jv) such that 
2":~= 1v/ z v implies that buyer i prefers a single bundled auction to J separate 
auctions. 
PROOF: Since a buyer's expected surplus in separate (and bundled) auctions is 
a continuous function of his or her vector of valuations, Theorem 7 follows 
almost as a Corollary to Theorem 6. There exists a neighborhood around 
( c 1 , •••• c1 ) = ( v, ... , v) such that the expected surplus for buyers with valua-
tions in the intersection of this neighborhood and the set of "possible" valuations 
(i.e., Q <::: v 1 <::: v, ... , Q <::: v1 <::: v) is greater in bundled auctions than in separate 
auctions. A subset of this neighborhood is the set of "possible" valuations such 
that 2":~= 1v, z Jv for some appropriate chosen v < v. This establishes the result. 
Q.E.D. 
The above cheorem can be strengthened somewhat if F( ·) is a symmetric 
distribution function. By symmetric, what is meant is that F(v - x) + F(Q + x) 
=I for all x E [O,(v -Q)]. 
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THEOREM 8: If F(.) is symmetric, then there exists a unique vn E [Q, v) such that 
buyer i prefers a single bundled auction to J separate auctions only if 2:~= 1v/;:::: Jvn. 
Furthermore v,, > (v +Q)/2. 
PROOF: First note that if F is symmetric then so is H, the I-fold convolution 
of F with itself. By this symmetry, it is easily verified that 
F(x) > H(Jx) for ( v+v) xE Q,~ and 
F(x) < H(lx) for ( v + v ) XE ~, .
Define G(v) = f ~ {[F(x)]" - 1 - [H(Jx>r - 1} dx. Note that G is continuous in v 
and G'(v) > O for vE(Q, (v+1l)/2) and G'(v) < O for vE((v+Q)/2,v). By 
Theorem 7, G(v) < 0 and G(Q) = 0. Therefore there exists a unique v E ((v +Q) 
/ 2, v) such that G(v) = 0. Note that all we needed for this result was that there 
be some point i5 such that F(x) ~ H(Jx) when x S v. Q.E.D. 
Notice that symmetry is clearly much stronger than is generally required. 
The seller's bundling decision is analyzed next. Define the expected surplus loss, 
~~. as the difference between expected total surplus in a bundled auction and the 
expected total surplus in J separate auctions. The following theorem provides a 
necessary and sufficient condition for a seller to prefer J separate auctions to a 
single bundled auction. 
THEOREM 9: A seller earns greater expected profit with J separate auctions than 
with a single bundled auction if and only 1f n~; - 1 > (n - 1)~~-
PROOF: As stated in Section 2, the seller's expected profit in an auction is the 
expected second highest valuation of the good (or bundle of goods) being sold. 
For an arbitrary distribution, G(t), the expected second highest value of n 
samples, denoted here by E( G;), is simply 
E(G~') = Ltn(n - l)G(t)"- 2(1 - G(t))g(t)dt 
where R is a support of the distribution. Also, the expected highest valuation out 
of n samples, denoted here by E ( G n, is 
E[ en = f tn( G( t))" - 1 g( t) dt , 
R 
because the cumulative distribution function of the first order statistic is equal to 
with probability density function 
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With a little algebraic manipulation, E [ G~'] can be expressed as a function of 
n, E(G;'), and E(G;- 1). 
(10) E(G~') = Ltn(n - l)G(tf-2(1 - G(t))g(t)dt 
= Ltn(I - G(t))g1,n_ 1(t)dt 
= nLtg1 n_ 1(t)dt- nLtG(t)g1.,,-i(t)dt 
= n Ltgl.n- 1( t) dt- ( n - I) Ltg1.,,(t) dt 
= nE(G;'- 1)- (n - l)E(G;'). 
With n buyers and J items, the seller will prefer to bundle the J items rather 
than auction them separately if and only if the expected value of the second 
order statistic of H, E(H~'), is greater than J times the expected value of the 
second order statistic of F, since these are the seller's expected profits in bundled 
and separate auctions, respectively. According to (10), this means that the seller 
prefers separate auctions if and only if 
which can be rewritten as 
In the notation of surplus losses, this inequality is 
n6] - 1 > ( n - I )6] . Q.E.D. 
This theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility of 
the seller's bundling decision with ex ante efficiency. This condition must hold 
for some large values of n, and in fact it will hold for infinitely many n for the 
following reason. Since 6]- 1 > 0 and 6] > 0 for all n, a sufficient condition for 
this is 6] < 6]- 1• That is, the seller prefers separate auctions to a bundled 
auction if the surplus loss with n bidders is less than the surplus loss with (n - I) 
bidders. 
PROPOSITION: The surplus loss from the bundled auction vanishes to zero as n 
becomes large. 
PROOF: Jim,, •xE(Hn =JV= limn-+r.JE(F;'). That is, as the sample size be-
comes greater and greater, the expected highest value approaches the maximum 
value in the support. 
Therefore, the surplus loss for n buyers produces an infinite sequence of 
positive numbers which converge to zero in the limit. The conclusion is that the 
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condition in Theorem 9 holds for infinitely many n. Thus, although the seller 
bundles when there are very few buyers, the seller must have a strong tendency 
to conduct separate auctions when there are larger numbers of buyers. 
The notion that the seller's incentive to bundle diminishes as the number of 
buyers increases can be stated in another way. Suppose that n is sufficiently 
large, say n 2:: iii, so that the expected second highest valuation is greater than the 
mean of the underlying distribution of values. Then there exists a J such that for 
all J 2:: J the seller will choose not to bundle all J items together. The logic 
behind this proposition is the following. Recall that a seller will prefer to bundle 
all J items rather than conduct J separate auctions if and only if the expected 
value of the second highest valuation out of n draws from the distribution of 
valuations is less than the expected value of the second highest mean valuation 
(averaged over a buyer's J values) out of n samples of the distribution of mean 
valuations. (Note that the distribution of these mean valuations corresponds to 
the distribution of valuations for bundles.) As J increases, with n fixed, by the 
law of large numbers the expected second highest mean valuation converges to 
the expected value of the underlying distribution of valuations. Since iii was 
chosen so that the expected second highest valuation from a sample of iii is 
greater than the expected value of the underlying distribution of values. this 
convergence guarantees the existence of such a number, J for all n 2:: iii. Thus. 
for any n 2:: N there is a corresponding number J,, with the property described 
above. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined an extension of recent theoretical work on demand 
revealing mechanisms commonly employed by single product monopolists (auc-
tions) to the case of many goods, and has used these results to analyze an 
industrial organization problem (bundling), which heretofore has typically been 
analyzed in a world of certainty in which the monopolist uses a fixed-price 
pricing scheme. It has been demonstrated that lack of complete information can 
lead to suboptimal allocations in monopolized multiproduct markets. This is in 
contrast to earlier results obtained for an environment of single-product auction 
markets. 10 Specifically, imperfect information was found to lead the monopolist 
10See, for example, Vickrey [20], Harris and Raviv [6], Matthews [9]. This is not to deny that 
suboptimal allocations can occur in single-product auction markets. If the seller sets a minimum 
acceptable bid at a level greater than v, then ineffi ciencies mav result. Note, however. that in the 
above analysis it has implicitly been assumed that the seller ~ever rejects a winning bid on the 
grounds that it is not high enough. It has been established elsewhere (e.g .. Harris and Raviv [7]) that 
this assumed behavior is optimal if Q is sufficiently greater than the sellers cost. For example. if the 
distribution of values is uniform on [!,'.. v], and the seller has zero cost, then as long as Q > E/ 2. the 
seller will never have an incentive to set a minimum acceptable bid. In cases like this. the equilibrium 
allocation in a single-product auction will always be efficient. In other words. by making the implicit 
assumption that buyer valuations are sufficiently greater than the seller's cost so that no effective 
reserve bid is set by the seller, we are able to isolate the distortionary effects of bundling from the 
inefficiencies caused by restricting output (i.e. setting a reserve bid). 
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to bundle output in situations which a monopolist with complete information 
would not choose to bundle. 11 Furthermore it was shown that the behavior of the 
monopolist was largely affected by the number of buyers in the market and not 
particularly sensitive to the distribution of buyer valuations. 
One always hopes that a theoretical model is flexible enough so that some 
interesting extensions can be obtained when certain assumptions are relaxed. The 
results obtained in this paper are suggestive of what one might expect in a variety 
of different environments. First, as noted at the end of Section 3, the results for 
the two bidder case do not depend at all on the particular informational 
assumptions. Second, the seller can reduce risk by bundling the goods he is 
selling since the distribution of valuations for a bundle is always less dispersed 
than the distribution of valuations of a separate goods. Thus a risk averse seller 
will have a stronger tendency to bundle than the risk neutral seller discussed 
here. As noted in Remark 4 of Section 3, with two bidders, the seller will bundle 
regardless of his risk attitudes. Third, all the results hold for discriminatory 
(first-price) as well as Vickrey auctions, with one exception which was noted in 
Remark 6 of Section 3. 
Also, the fact that the seller may have an incentive to bundle when values are 
additive indicates that in some cases in which valuations are subadditive the 
seller may still prefer to bundle. Moreover, if valuations are superadditive and 
there are a sufficiently large number of buyers, the seller may be better off 
conducting separate auctions. Conceivably, behavior of the latter sort could be 
ex ante efficient yet make buyers worse off on average. Possibilities such as this 
are nonintuitive at first glance and deserve further examination. Other directions 
worth pursuing include relaxing assumptions about the independence of the 
random variables in the model, the particular pricing mechanism used by the 
monopolist, and the discreteness of the goods. 
Carnegie-Iv/ ell on Universi(v 
Manuscript received October, 1980; revision received April, 1982. 
11 Note that a monopolist with perfect information would be able to capture all of the buyer 
surplus by selling each product at a price equal to the highest valuation for the product. Since values 
are additive. there is never an incentive for a monopolist with complete information to bundle. 
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